Abstract. Before starting the security analysis of an existing system, the most likely outcome is often already clear, namely that the system is not entirely secure. Modifying a program such that it passes the analysis is a difficult problem and usually left entirely to the programmer. In this article, we show that and how unification can be used to compute such program transformations. This opens a new perspective on the problem of correcting insecure programs. We demonstrate that integrating our approach into an existing transforming type system can also improve the precision of the analysis and the quality of the resulting programs.
Introduction
Security requirements like confidentiality or integrity can often be adequately expressed by restrictions on the permitted flow of information. This approach goes beyond access control models in that it controls not only the access to data, but also how data is propagated within a program after a legitimate access.
Security type systems provide a basis for automating the information flow analysis of concrete programs [SM03]. If type checking succeeds then a program has secure information flow. If type checking fails then the program might be insecure and should not be run. After a failed type check, the task of correcting the program is often left to the programmer. Given the significance of the problem, it would be very desirable to have automated tools that better support the programmer in this task. For the future, we envision a framework for the information flow analysis that, firstly, gives more constructive advice on how a given program could be improved and, secondly, in some cases automatically corrects the program, or parts thereof, without any need for interaction by the programmer. The current article focuses on the second of these two aspects.
Obviously, one cannot allow an automatic transformation to modify programs in completely arbitrary ways as the transformed program should resemble the original program in some well-defined way. Such constraints can be captured by defining an equivalence relation on programs and demanding that the transformed program is equivalent to the original program under this relation. A second equivalence relation can be used to capture the objective of a transformation. The problem of removing implicit information leaks from a program can be viewed as the problem of making alternative execution paths observationally equivalent. For instance, if the guard of a conditional depends on a secret then the two branches must be observationally equivalent because, otherwise, an untrusted observer might be able to deduce the value of the guard and, thereby, the secret. The PER model [SS99] even reduces the problem of making an entire program secure to the problem of making the program equivalent to itself.
In our approach, meta-variables are inserted into a program and are instantiated with programs during the transformation. The problem of making two program fragments equivalent is cast as a unification problem, which allows us to automatically compute suitable substitutions using existing unification algorithms. The approach is parametric in two equivalence relations. The first relation captures the semantic equivalence to be preserved by the transformation while the second relation captures the observational equivalence to be achieved.
We define two concrete equivalence relations to instantiate our approach and integrate this instance into an existing transforming type system [SS00]. This results in a security type system that is capable of recognizing some secure programs and of correcting some insecure programs that are rejected by the original type system. Moreover, the resulting programs are faster and often substantially smaller in size. Another advantage over the cross-copying technique [Aga00] , which constitutes the current state of the art in this area, is that security policies with more than two levels can be considered. Besides these technical advantages, the use of unification yields a very natural perspective on the problem of making two programs observationally equivalent. However, we do not claim that using unification will solve all problems with repairing insecure programs or that unification would be the only way to achieve the above technical advantages.
The contributions of this article are a novel approach to making the information flow in a given program secure and the demonstration that transforming security type systems can benefit from the integration of this approach.
The Approach
The observational capabilities of an attacker can be captured by an equivalence relation on configurations, i.e. pairs consisting of a program and a state. Namely, (C 1 , s 1 ) is observationally equivalent to (C 2 , s 2 ) for an attacker a if and only if the observations that a makes when C 1 is run in state s 1 equal a's observations when C 2 is run in s 2 . The programs C 1 and C 2 are observationally equivalent for a if, for all states s 1 and s 2 that are indistinguishable for a, the configurations (C 1 , s 1 ) and (C 2 , s 2 ) are observationally equivalent for a. The resulting relation on programs is only a partial equivalence relation (PER), i.e. a transitive and symmetric relation that need not be reflexive. If a program C is not observationally equivalent to itself for a then running C in two indistinguishable states may lead to different observations and, thereby, reveal the differences between the states or, in other words, let a learn secret information. This observation is the key to capturing secure information flow in the PER model [SS99] in which a program is secure if and only if it is observationally equivalent to itself.
In this article, we focus on the removal of implicit information leaks from a program. There is a danger of implicit information leakage if the flow of control depends on a secret and the alternative execution paths are not observationally equivalent for an attacker. The program if h then l:=1 else l:=0, for instance, causes information to flow from the boolean guard h into the variable l, and this constitutes an illegitimate information leak if h stores a secret and the value of l is observable for the attacker. Information can also be leaked in a similar way, e.g., when the guard of a loop depends on a secret, when it depends on a secret whether an exception is raised, or when the target location of a jump depends on a secret. For brevity of the presentation, we focus on the case of conditionals.
We view the problem of making the branches of a conditional equivalent as a unification problem under a theory that captures observational equivalence. To this end, we insert meta-variables into the program under consideration that can be substituted during the transformation. For a given non-transforming security type system, the rule for conditionals is modified such that, instead of checking whether the branches are equivalent, the rule calculates a unifier of the branches and applies it to the conditional. Typing rules for other language constructs are lifted such that they propagate the transformations that have occurred in the analysis of the subprograms. In summary, our approach proceeds as follows:
1. Lift the given program by inserting meta-variables at suitable locations. 2. Repair the lifted program by applying lifted typing rules. 3. Eliminate all remaining meta-variables.
The approach is not only parametric in the given security type system and in the theory under which branches are unified, but also in where meta-variables are placed and how they may be substituted. The latter two parameters determine how similar a transformed program is to the original program. They also limit the extent to which insecure programs can be corrected. For instance, one might decide to insert meta-variables between every two sub-commands and to permit the substitution of meta-variables with arbitrary programs. For these choices, lifting P 1 = if h then l:=1 else l:=0 results in if h then (α 1 ; l:=1; α 2 ) else (α 3 ; l:=0; α 4 ) and the substitution {α 1 \l:=0, α 2 \ , α 3 \ , α 4 \l:=1} (where is denotes the empty program) is a unifier of the branches under any equational theory as the substituted program is if h then (l:=0; l:=1) else (l:=0; l:=1). Alternatively, one might decide to restrict the range of substitutions to sequences of skip statements. This ensures that the transformed program more closely resembles the original program, essentially any transformed program is a slowed-down version of the original program, but makes it impossible to correct programs like P 1 . However, the program P 2 = if h then (skip; l:=1) else l:=1, which is insecure in a multi-threaded setting (as we will explain later in this section), can be corrected under these choices to if h then (skip; l:=1) else (skip; l:=1). Alternatively, one could even decide to insert higher-order meta-variables such that lifting P 1 leads to if h then α 1 (l:=1) else α 2 (l:=0) and applying, e.g., the unifier {α 1 \(λx.skip), α 2 \(λx.skip)} results in if h then skip else skip while applying the unifier {α 1 \(λx.x), α 2 \(λx.l:=1)} results in if h then l:=1 else l:=1. These examples just illustrate the wide spectrum of possible choices for defining in which sense a transformed program must be equivalent to the original program. Ultimately it depends on the application, how flexible one is in dealing with the trade-off between being able to correct more insecure programs and having transformed programs that more closely resemble the original programs.
There also is a wide spectrum of possible choices for defining the (partial) observational equivalence relation. For simplicity, assume that variables are classified as either low or high depending on whether their values are observable by the attacker (low variables) or secret (high variables). As a convention, we denote low variables by l and high variables by h, possibly with indexes and primes. Given that the values of low variables are only observable at the end of a program run, the programs P 3 = (skip; l := 0) and P 4 = (l := h; l := 0) are observationally equivalent and each is equivalent to itself (which means secure information flow in the PER model). However, if the attacker can observe also the intermediate values of low variables then they are not equivalent and, moreover, only P 3 is secure while P 4 is insecure. If the attacker can observe the timing of assignments or the duration of a program run then P 2 = if h then (skip; l:=1) else l:=1 is insecure and, hence, not observationally equivalent to itself. In a multi-threaded setting, P 2 should be considered insecure even if the attacker cannot observe the timing of assignments or the duration of a program run. If P 3 = (skip; l := 0) is run in parallel with P 2 under a shared memory and a round-robin scheduler that re-schedules after every sub-command then the final value of l is 0 and 1 if the initial value of h is 0 and 1, respectively. That is, a program that is observationally equivalent to itself in a sequential setting might not be observationally equivalent to itself in a multi-threaded setting -for the same attacker.
Instantiating the Approach
We are now ready to illustrate how our approach can be instantiated. We introduce a simple programming language, a security policy, an observational equivalence, and a program equivalence to be preserved under the transformation.
Programming Language. We adopt the multi-threaded while language (short: MWL) from [SS00], which includes assignments, conditionals, loops, and a command for dynamic thread creation. The set Com of commands is defined by
where V is a command vector in Com = n∈N Com n . Expressions are variables, constants, or terms resulting from applying binary operators to expressions. A state is a mapping from variables in a given set Var to values in a given set Val . We use the judgment |Exp, s| ↓ n for specifying that expression Exp evaluates to value n in state s. Expression evaluation is assumed to be total and to occur atomically. We say that expressions Exp and Exp are equivalent to each other (denoted by Exp≡Exp ) if and only if they evaluate to identical values in each state, i.e. ∀s ∈ S : ∀v ∈ Val : |Exp, s| ↓ v ⇔ |Exp , s| ↓ v.
The operational semantics for MWL is formalized in Figures 5 and 6 in the appendix. Deterministic judgments have the form |C, s| |W, t| expressing that command C performs a computation step in state s, yielding a state t and a vector of commands W , which has length zero if C terminated, length one if it has neither terminated nor spawned any threads, and length > 1 if threads were spawned. That is, a command vector of length n can be viewed as a pool of n threads that run concurrently. Nondeterministic judgments have the form |V, s| |V , t| expressing that some thread C i in the thread pool V performs a step in state s resulting in the state t and some thread pool W . The global thread pool V results then by replacing C i with W . For simplicity, we do not distinguish between commands and command vectors of length one in the notation and use the term program for referring to commands as well as to command vectors. A configuration is then a pair |V, s| where V specifies the threads that are currently active and s defines the current state of the memory.
In the following, we adopt the naming conventions used above. That is, s, t denote states, Exp denotes an expression, B denotes a boolean expression, C denotes a command, and V, W denote command vectors.
Security Policy and Labellings. We assume a two-domain security policy, where the requirement is that there is no flow of information from the high domain to the low domain. This is the simplest policy under which the problem of secure information flow can be studied. Each program variable is associated with a security domain by means of a labeling lab : Var → {low , high}. The intuition is that values of low variables can be observed by the attacker and, hence, should only be used to store public data. High variables are used for storing secret data and, hence, their values must not be observable for the attacker. As mentioned before, we use l and h to denote high and low variables, respectively. An expression Exp has the security domain low (denoted by Exp : low ) if all variables in Exp have domain low and, otherwise, has security domain high (denoted by Exp : high). The intuition is that values of expressions with domain high possibly depend on secrets while values of low expressions can only depend on public data.
Observational Equivalence. The rules in Figure 1 inductively define a relation L ⊆ Com × Com that will serve us as an observational equivalence relation.
The relation L captures observational equivalence for an attacker who can see the values of low variables at any point during a program run and cannot distinguish states s 1 and s 2 if they are low equal (denoted by s 1 = L s 2 ), i.e. if ∀var ∈ Var : lab(var ) = low =⇒ s 1 (var ) = s 2 (var ). He cannot distinguish two program runs that have equal length and in which every two corresponding states are low equal. For capturing this intuition, Sabelfeld and Sands introduce the notion of a strong low bisimulation. The relation L also captures this intuition and, moreover, programs that are related by L are also strongly bisimilar. That is, L is a decidable approximation of the strong bisimulation relation.
Definition 1 ([SS00]).
The strong low-bisimulation L is the union of all symmetric relations R on command vectors V, V ∈ Com of equal size, i.e. V = C 1 , . . . , C n and V = C 1 , . . . , C n , such that ∀s, s , t ∈ S : ∀i ∈ {1 . . . n} : ∀W ∈ Com:
The proofs of this and all subsequent results will be provided in an extended version of this article.
Remark 1. Note that L and L are only partial equivalence relations, i.e. they are transitive and symmetric, but not reflexive. For instance, the program l:=h is not L -related to itself because the precondition of [LA], the only rule in Figure 1 applicable to assignments to low variables, rules out that high variables occur on the right hand side of the assignment. Moreover, the program l:=h is not strongly low bisimilar to itself because the states s and t (defined by s(l) = 0, s(h) = 0, t(l) = 0, t(h) = 1) are low equal, but the states s and t resulting after l:=h is run in s and t, respectively, are not low equal (s (l) = 0 = 1 = t (l)). However, L is an equivalence relation if one restricts programs to the language Slice that we define as the largest sub-language of Com without assignments of high expressions to low variables, assignments to high variables, and loops or conditionals having high guards. On Slice, L even constitutes a congruence relation. This sub-language is the context in which we will apply unification and, hence, using the term unification under an equational theory is justified. ♦ Program Equivalence. We introduce an equivalence relation to constrain the modifications caused by the transformation. Intuitively, this relation requires a transformed program to be a slowed down version of the original program. This is stronger than the constraint in [SS00].
Definition 2. The weak possibilistic bisimulation is the union of all symmetric relations R on command vectors such that whenever V R V then for all states s, t and all vectors W there is a vector W such that
Lifting a Security Type System
In this section we introduce a formal framework for transforming programs by inserting and instantiating meta-variables. Rather than developing an entirely new formalism from scratch, we adapt an existing security type system from [SS00]. We show that any transformation within our framework is sound in the sense that the output is secure and the behavior of the original program is preserved in the sense of Definition 2. Substitutions and Liftings. We insert meta-variables from a set V = {α 1 , α 2 , . . . } into a program by sequential composition with its sub-terms. The extension of MWL with meta-variables is denoted by MWL V . The set Com V of commands in MWL V is defined by
where placeholders X, Y range over V. Analogously to MWL, the set of all command vectors in MWL V is defined by Com V = n∈N (Com V ) n . Note that the ground programs in MWL V are exactly the programs in MWL. The operational semantics for such programs remain unchanged, whereas programs with metavariables are not meant to be executed.
Meta-variables may be substituted with programs, meta-variables or the special symbol that acts as the neutral element of the sequential composition operator (";"), i.e. ; C = C and C; = C 4 . When talking about programs in Com V under a given substitution, we implicitly assume that these equations have been applied (from left to right) to eliminate the symbol from the program. Moreover, we view sequential composition as an associative operator and implicitly identify programs that differ only in the use of parentheses for sequential composition. That is, C 1 ; (C 2 ; C 3 ) and (C 1 ; C 2 ); C 3 denote the same program.
A mapping σ : V → ({ } ∪ V ∪ Com V ) is a substitution if the set {α ∈ V | σ(α) = α} is finite. A substitution mapping each meta-variable in a program V to { } ∪ Com is a ground substitution of V . A substitution π mapping all meta-variables in V to is a projection of V . Given a program V in Com, we call every program V in Com V with πV = V a lifting of V .
For example, the program if h then (α 1 ; skip; α 2 ; l:=1) else (α 3 ; l:=1) is in fact a lifting of if h then (skip; l:=1) else l:=1. In the remainder of this article, we will focus on substitutions with a restricted range.
Definition 3. A substitution with range { } ∪ Stut V is called preserving, where Stut V is defined by C ::= X | skip | C 1 ; C 2 (the C i range over Stut V ).
The term preserving substitution is justified by the fact that such substitutions preserve a given program's semantics as specified in Definition 2.
Theorem 2 (Preservation of Behavior).
1. Let V ∈ Com V . For all preserving substitutions σ, ρ that are ground for V , we have σ(V ) ρ(V ). 2. Let V ∈ Com. For each lifting V of V and each preserving substitution σ with σ(V ) ground, we have σ(V ) V .
Unification of Programs. The problem of finding a substitution that makes the branches of conditionals with high guards observationally equivalent can be viewed as the problem of finding a unifier for the branches under the equational theory L . 5 To this end, we lift the relation L ⊆ Com × Com to a binary relation on Com V that we also denote by L .
A substitution σ is a preserving unifier for ∆ if and only if σ is preserving and σV i L σV i holds for each i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. A L -unification problem is solvable if the set of preserving unifiers U(∆) for ∆ is not empty.
A Transforming Type System. The transforming type system in Figure 2 has been derived from the one in [SS00]. We use the judgment V → V : S for denoting that the MWL V -program V can be transformed into an MWL V -program V . The intention is that V has secure information flow and reflects the semantics of V as specified by Definition 2. The slice S is a program that is in the sub-language Slice V and describes the timing behavior of V . The novelty over [SS00] is that our type system operates on Com V (rather than on Com) and that the rule for high conditionals has been altered. In the original type system, a high conditional is transformed by sequentially composing each branch with the The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorems 2 and 3. It shows that lifting a program and then applying the transforming type system preserves a program's behavior in the desired way.
S is derivable for some lifting V * ∈ Com V of a program V ∈ Com then V has secure information flow and V V .
Automating the Transformation
In Section 4, we have shown our type system to be sound for any choice of liftings and preserving unifiers in the applications of rule [Cond h ]. For automating the transformation, we have to define more concretely where meta-variables are inserted and how unifiers are determined.
Fig. 3. A calculus for computing most general liftings
Automatic Insertion of Meta-Variables. When lifting a program, one is faced with a trade off: inserting meta-variables means to create possibilities for correcting the program, but it also increases the complexity of the unification problem. Within this spectrum our objective is to minimize the number of inserted meta-variables without losing the possibility of correcting the program.
To this end, observe that two programs C 1 and C 2 within the sub-language Pad V , the extension of Stut V with high assignments, are related via L whenever they contain the same number of constants, i.e., skips and assignments to high variables (denoted as const(C 1 ) = const(C 2 )), and the same number of occurrences of each meta-variable α (denoted by |C 1 | α = |C 2 | α ). Note that the positioning of meta-variables is irrelevant.
Lemma 1. For two commands C 1 and C 2 in Pad V we have C 1 L C 2 if and only if const(C 1 ) = const(C 2 ) and ∀α ∈ V :
Moreover, observe that inserting one meta-variable next to another does not create new possibilities for correcting a program. This, together with Lemma 1, implies that inserting one meta-variable into every subprogram within Pad V is sufficient for allowing every possible correction. We use this insight to define a mapping : Com → Com V that calculates a lifting of a program by inserting one fresh meta-variable at the end of every sub-program in Pad V , and between every two sub-programs outside Pad V . The mapping is defined inductively: A fresh meta-variable is sequentially composed to the right hand side of each subprogram. Another fresh meta-variable is sequentially composed to the left hand side of each assignment to a low variable, fork, while loop, or conditional. A lifting of a sequentially composed program is computed by sequentially composing the liftings of the subprograms while removing the terminal variable of the left program.The full calculus is given in Figure 3 . The liftings computed by are most general in the sense that if two programs can be made observationally equivalent for some lifting then they can be made equivalent for the lifting computed by . In other words, is complete.
Theorem 4. Let V 1 , V 2 , V 1 , and V 2 be in Com V and let V 1 , V 2 ∈ Com.
2. Suppose V 1 (V 2 ) shares no meta-variables with V 1 , V 2 , and V 2 (V 1 , V 2 , and V 1 ). If V 1 V 1 and V 2 V 2 can be derived and V 1 and V 2 are liftings
Integrating Standard Unification Algorithms. Standard algorithms for unification modulo an associative and commutative operator with neutral element and constants (see, e.g., [BS01] for background information on AC 1 unification) build on a characterization of equality that is equivalent to the one in Lemma 1. This correspondence allows one to employ existing algorithms for AC 1 -unification problems with constants and free function symbols (like, e.g., the one in [HS87] ) to the unification problems that arise when applying the rule for conditionals and then to filter the output such that only preserving substitutions remain.
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Automating Unification. In the following, we go beyond simply applying an existing unification algorithm by exploiting the specific shape of our unification problems and the limited range of substitutions in the computation of unifiers. Recall that we operate on programs in Slice V , i.e., on programs without assignments to high variables, without assignments of high expressions to low variables, and without loops or conditionals having high guards.
The operative intuition behind our problem-tailored unification algorithm is to scan two program terms from left to right and distinguish two cases: if both leftmost subcommands are free constructors, (low assignments, loops, conditionals and forks) they are compared and, if they agree, unification is recursively applied to pairs of corresponding subprograms and the residual programs. If one leftmost subcommand is skip, both programs are decomposed into their maximal initial subprograms in Stut V and the remaining program. Unification is recursively applied to the corresponding subprograms. Formally, we define the language NSeq V of commands in Slice V \ {skip} without sequential composition as a top-level operator, and the language NStut V of commands in which the leftmost subcommand is not an element of Stut V . NStut V is given by C ::= C 1 ; C 2 , where C 1 ∈ NSeq V and C 2 ∈ Slice V .
The unification algorithm in Figure 4 is given in form of a calculus for deriving judgments of the form C 1 ? L C 2 :: η, meaning that η is a preserving unifier of the commands C 1 and C 2 . Note that the unifiers obtained from recursive application of the algorithm to sub-programs are combined by set union. This is admissible if the meta-variables in all subprograms are disjoint, as the following lemma shows:
Lemma 2. Let V 1 , V 2 ∈ Slice V and let every variable occur at most once in
Observe that the stand-alone unification algorithm is not complete, as it relies on the positions of meta-variables inserted by . However, we can prove a completeness result for the combination of both calculi. 8 Fortunately, the instantiation of our framework presented in this section does not suffer from such problems.
Theorem 5 (Completeness). Let V ∈ Com, V , W ∈ Com V , W be a lifting of V , and V V .
If there is a preserving substitution σ with σW
Here, the judgment V → V : S denotes a successful transformation of V to V by the transformational type system, where the precondition
Related Work and Discussion
Type-based approaches to analyzing the security of the information flow in concrete programs have received much attention in recent years [SM03] . This resulted in security type systems for a broad range of languages (see, e.g., [VS97,SV98,HR98,Mye99,Sab01,SM02,BN02,HY02,BC02,ZM03,MS04]).
Regarding the analysis of conditionals with high guards, Volpano and Smith [VS98] proposed the atomic execution of entire conditionals for enforcing observational equivalence of alternative execution paths. This somewhat restrictive constraint is relaxed in the work of Agat [Aga00] and Sabelfeld and Sands [SS00] who achieve observational equivalence by cross-copying the slices of branches. The current article introduces unification modulo an equivalence relation as another alternative for making the branches of a conditional observationally equivalent to each other. Let us compare the latter two approaches more concretely for the relation L that we have introduced to instantiate our approach.
The type system introduced in Section 4 is capable of analyzing programs where assignments to low variables appear in the branches of conditionals with high guards, which is not possible with the type system in [SS00].
Example 1. If one lifts C = if h 1 then (h 2 :=Exp 1 ; l:=Exp 2 ) else (l:=Exp 2 ) where Exp 2 : low using our lifting calculus, applies our transforming type system, and finally removes all remaining meta-variables by applying a projection then this results in if h 1 then (h 2 :=Exp 1 ; l:=Exp 2 ) else (skip; l:=Exp 2 ), a program that is strongly secure and also weakly bisimilar to C. Note that the program C cannot be repaired by applying the type system from [SS00]. ♦ Another advantage of our unification-based approach over the cross-copying technique is that the resulting programs are faster and smaller in size. Note that the idempotence of the transformation is a crucial prerequisite (but not a sufficient one) for the existence of a fixpoint and, hence, for the termination of such an iterative approach. As is illustrated in Example 2, the transformation realized by our type system is idempotent, whereas the transformation from [SS00] is not. Another possibility to tackle multi-level security policies in our setting is to unify the branches of a conditional with guard of security level D under the theory D ≥D D . An investigation of this possibility remains to be done.
The chosen instantiation of our approach preserves the program behavior in the sense of a weak bisimulation. Naturally, one can correct more programs if one is willing to relax this relationship between input and output of the transformation. For this reason, there are also some programs that cannot be corrected with our type system although they can be corrected with the type system in [SS00] (which assumes a weaker relationship between input and output). Example 4. if h then (while l do (h 1 :=Exp)) else (h 2 :=1) is rejected by our type system. The type system in [SS00] transforms it into the strongly secure program if h then (while l do (h 1 :=Exp); skip) else (while l do (skip); h 2 :=1). Note that this program is not weakly bisimilar to the original program as the cross-copying of the while loop introduces possible non-termination. ♦
If one wishes to permit such transformations, one could, for instance, choose a simulation instead of the weak bisimulation when instantiating our approach. This would result in an extended range of substitutions beyond Stut V . For instance, to correct the program in Example 4, one needs to instantiate a metavariable with a while loop. We are confident that, in such a setting, using our approach would even further broaden the scope of corrections while retaining the advantage of transformed programs that are comparably small and fast.
Conclusions
We proposed a novel approach to analyzing the security of information flow in concrete programs with the help of transforming security type systems where the key idea has been to integrate unification with typing rules. This yielded a very natural perspective on the problem of eliminating implicit information flow. We instantiated our approach by defining a program equivalence capturing the behavioral equivalence to be preserved during the transformation and an observational equivalence capturing the perspective of a low-level attacker. This led to a novel transforming security type system and calculi for automatically inserting meta-variables into programs and for computing substitutions. We proved that the resulting analysis technique is sound and also provided a relative completeness result. The main advantages of our approach include that the precision of type checking is improved, that additional insecure programs can be corrected, and that the resulting programs are faster and smaller in size.
It will be interesting to see how our approach performs for other choices of the parameters like, e.g., observational equivalences that admit intentional declassification [MS04] ). Another interesting possibility is to perform the entire information flow analysis and program transformation using unification without any typing rules, which would mean to further explore the possibilities of the PER model. Finally, it would be desirable to integrate our fully automatic transformation into an interactive framework for supporting the programmer in correcting insecure programs. 
A Semantics of MWL
The operational semantics for MWL are given in Figures 5 and 6 .
B Proofs of the Technical Results

B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Before proving Theorem 1, we introduce a lemma and prove it using the bisimulationup-to technique.
Definition 7. A binary relation R on commands is a strong low bisimulation up to L if R is symmetric and ∀C, C , C 1 , . . . , C n ∈ Com: ∀s, s , t ∈ S: . Small-step deterministic semantics
+ where + returns the transitive closure of a relation and ↑ returns the pointwise lifting of a relation on commands to command vectors (here, R ∪ L is viewed as a relation on commands). We obtain Q ⊆ L from the fact that Q satisfies the implication in Definition 1 (replacing R in the definition by Q). The implication can be proved by a straightforward induction over the Q-distance between the related programs where the Q-distance between V and V is the minimal length of a sequence V 1 , . . . , V n with the properties ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n} : V i (R∪ L ) ↑ V i+1 , V 0 = V , and V n+1 = V . Such a sequence exists because V 0 Q V n+1 holds. We obtain R ⊆ L from R ⊆ Q (by definition of Q) and the transitivity of ⊆.
Lemma 3.
If Id
Proof. In each case, we prove the strong low bisimilarity of the two commands with the bisimulation up-to technique. That is, we define a binary relation R on commands that relates the two commands and prove that R is a strong low bisimulation up to L . From Theorem 6, we then obtain that the two given commands are strongly low bisimilar.
1. Define R as the symmetric closure of the relation {(skip , Id :=Exp) | Id :
high}
Let (C 1 ; C 2 , C 1 ; C 2 ) ∈ R and s, s , t ∈ S be arbitrary with s = L s and |C 1 ; C 2 , s| |C * , t| for some C * ∈ Com. We make a case distinction on C * according to the operational semantics: (a) C * = C 2 : From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 , s| | , t| . Since C 1 L C 1 and s = L s , there is a t ∈ S with |C 1 , s | | , t | and t = L t according to Definition 1. From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 ; C 2 , s | |C 2 , t | with C 2 L C 2 (by definition of R) and t = L t . (b) C * = C; C 2 V for some C ∈ Com and V ∈ Com (possibly V = ). From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 , s| | C V, t| . Since, C 1 L C 1 and s = L s , there are C ∈ Com, V ∈ Com, and t ∈ S with |C 1 , s | | C V , t | , C L C , V L V , and t = L t . From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 ; C 2 , s | | C ; C 2 V , t | with (C; C 2 , C ; C 2 ) ∈ R (follows from C L C , C 2 L C 2 , and the definition of R), V L V , and t = L t . Hence, R is a strong low bisimulation up to L . 4. Define R as the symmetric relation
Let (fork(CV ) , fork(C V )) ∈ R and s, s ∈ S be arbitrary with s = L s . From the operational semantics, we obtain |fork(CV ), s| | C V, s| and |fork(C V ), s | | C V , s | . From the definition of R and Definition 1, we obtain C V L C V . Hence, R is a strong low bisimulation up to L . 5. Define R as the symmetric relation
Let (while B do C 1 , while B do C 1 ) ∈ R and s, s , t ∈ S be arbitrary with s = L s . We make a case distinction on the value of B in s: From the operational semantics, we obtain |while B do C 1 , s| |C 1 ; while B do C 1 , s| and |while B do C 1 , s | |C 1 ; while B do C 1 , s | with (C 1 ; while B do C 1 , C 1 ; while B do C 1 ) ∈ R (follows from B, B : low , B ≡ B , C 1 L C 1 , and the definition of R) and s = L s . Let (C 1 ; while B do C 2 , C 1 ; while B do C 2 ) ∈ R and s, s ∈ S be arbitrary with s = L s and |C 1 ; while B do C 2 , s| |C * , t| for some C * ∈ Com. We make a case distinction on C * according to the operational semantics:
(a) C * = while B do C 2 : From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 , s| | , t| . Since C 1 L C 1 and s = L s , there is a t ∈ S with |C 1 , s | | , t | and t = L t according to Definition 1. From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 ; while B do C 2 , s | |while B do C 2 , t | with (while B do C 2 , while B do C 2 ) ∈ R (follows from B, B : low , B ≡ B , C 2 L C 2 , and the definition of R) and t = L t . (b) C * = C; while B do C 2 V for some C ∈ Com and V ∈ Com (possibly V = ). From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 , s| | C V, t| . Since, C 1 L C 1 and s = L s , there are C ∈ Com, V ∈ Com, and t ∈ S with |C 1 , s
, and t = L t . From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 ; while B do C 2 , s | | C ; while B do C 2 V , t | with (C; while B do C 2 , C ; while B do C 2 ) ∈ R (follows from C L C , while B do C 2 L while B do C 2 , and the definition of R), V L V , and t = L t .
Hence, R is a strong low bisimulation up to L . 6. Define R as the symmetric relation {(if
Let (if B then C 1 else C 2 , if B then C 1 else C 2 ) ∈ R and s, s ∈ S be arbitrary with s = L s . We make a case distinction on the value of B in s: (a) |B, s| ↓ False: From s = L s , B, B : low, and B ≡ B , we obtain |B , s | ↓ False. From the operational semantics, we obtain |if B then C 1 else C 2 , s| |C 2 , s| and |if
From s = L s , B, B : low, and B ≡ B , we obtain |B , s | ↓ True. From the operational semantics, we obtain |if B then C 1 else C 2 , s| |C 1 , s| and |if
Hence, R is a strong low bisimulation up to L . 7. Define R as the symmetric closure of the relation
Let (skip; C 1 , if B then C 1 else C 2 ) ∈ R and s, s ∈ S be arbitrary with s = L s . We make a case distinction on the value of B in s :
(a) |B , s | ↓ False: From the operational semantics, we obtain |skip; C 1 , s| |C 1 , s| and |if
From the operational semantics, we obtain |skip; C 1 , s| |C 1 , s| and |if B then C 1 else C 2 , s | |C 1 , s | with s = L s . By definition of R, we have C 1 L C 1 . Let (if B then C 1 else C 2 , skip; C 1 ) ∈ R and s, s ∈ S be arbitrary with s = L s . We make a case distinction on the value of B in s: (a) |B , s| ↓ False: Then we obtain |if B then C 1 else C 2 , s| |C 2 , s| and |skip; C 1 , s | |C 1 , s | from the operational semantics with s = L s . By definition of R, we have C 1 L C 2 . (b) |B , s| ↓ True: Then we obtain |if B then C 1 else C 2 , s| |C 1 , s| and |skip; C 1 , s | |C 1 , s | from the operational semantics with s = L s . By definition of R, we have C 1 L C 1 . Hence, R is a strong low bisimulation up to L .
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof (of Theorem 1). The proof proceeds by induction on the number of rule applications in the derivation
Base case: D consists of only a single rule application. We make a case distinction on this rule.
[Skip] The judgment derived is skip L skip. Lemma 3(1) implies skip L h:=h where h is an arbitrary variable with h : high. From symmetry and transitivity of L , we obtain skip L skip.
[ Step case: We make a case distinction depending on the rule applied at the root of D.
[SComp] The judgment derived is C 1 ; C 2 L C 1 ; C 2 and there are derivations D 1 and D 2 of C 1 L C 1 and C 2 L C 2 , respectively. From the induction assumption, we obtain C 1 L C 1 and C 2 L C 2 . Lemma 3(3) implies C 1 ; C 2 L C 1 ; C 2 .
[PComp] The judgment derived is C 1 , . . . , C n L C 1 , . . . , C n and there are derivations D i of C i L C i for i = 1, . . . , n. From the induction assumption, we obtain C i L C i for i = 1, . . . , n. From Definition 1, we obtain C 1 , . . . , C n L C 1 , . . . , C n .
[Fork ] The judgment derived is fork(C 1 V 1 ) L fork(C 1 V 1 ) and there are derivations D 1 and D 2 of C 1 L C 1 and V 1 L V 1 , respectively. From the induction assumption, we obtain C 1 L C 1 and V 1 L V 1 . Lemma 3(4) implies
[WL] The judgment derived is while B do C 1 L while B do C 1 with B, B : low , B ≡ B , and there is a derivation D 1 of C 1 L C 1 . Lemma 3(5) implies while B do C 1 L while B do C 1 .
[LIte] The judgment derived is if B then C 1 else C 2 L if B then C 1 else C 2 with B, B : low , B ≡ B , and there are derivations D 1 and D 2 of C 1 L C 1 and C 2 L C 2 , respectively. Lemma 3(6) implies if B then C 1 else C 2 L if B then C 1 else C 2 .
[SHIte 1 ] The judgment derived is skip; C 1 L if B then C 1 else C 2 with B : high and there are derivations D 1 and D 2 of C 1 L C 1 and C 1 L C 2 , respectively. From the induction assumption, we obtain C 1 L C 1 and C 1 L C 2 . Lemma 3(7) implies skip; C 1 L if B then C 1 else C 2 .
[SHIte 2 ] The judgment derived is if B then C 1 else C 2 L skip; C 1 with B : high and there are derivations D 1 and D 2 of C 1 L C 1 and C 2 L C 1 , respectively. From the induction assumption, we obtain C 1 L C 1 and C 2 L C 1 . Symmetry of L and Lemma 3(7) imply skip; C 1 L if B then C 1 else C 2 . From the symmetry of L , we obtain if B then C 1 else C 2 L skip; C 1
[HAHIte 1 ] The judgment derived is Id :=Exp; C 1 L if B then C 1 else C 2 with Id : high, B : high, and there are derivations
and transitivity of L , we obtain Id
[HAHIte 2 ] The judgment derived is if B then C 1 else C 2 L Id :=Exp ; C 1 with Id : high, B : high, and there are derivations D 1 and D 2 of C 1 L C 1 and C 2 L C 1 , respectively. From if B then C 1 else C 2 L skip; C 1 (see Case [SHIte 2 ]), skip; C 1 L Id :=Exp ; C 1 , and transitivity of L , we obtain if B then C 1 else C 2 L Id :=Exp ; C 1 .
[HIte] The judgment derived is if B then C 1 else C 2 L if B then C 1 else C 2 with B, B : high and there are derivations D 1 , D 2 , and D 3 of C 1 L C 1 , C 1 L C 2 , and C 1 L C 2 , respectively. From the induction assumption, we obtain C 1 L C 1 , C 1 L C 2 , and C 1 L C 2 . From symmetry and transitivity of L follows C 1 L C 1 . Lemma 3(7) implies skip; C 1 L if B then C 1 else C 2 and skip; C 1 L if B then C 1 else C 2 . From the symmetry and transitivity of L , we
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
For the proof of Theorem 2 we first strengthen our notion of bisimulation. Then we prove a lemma that shows that this relation is a congruence by using the up-to technique.
Definition 8. The pointwise weak bisimulation
is the union of all symmetric relations R on command vectors V, V ∈ Com of equal size, i.e. V = C 1 , . . . , C n and V = C 1 , . . . , C n , such that whenever V RV then for all states s, t and all i ∈ {1 . . . n} and all thread pools W there is a thread pool W with
Proof. Follows directly from Definitions 2 and 8 and the operational semantics for thread pools.
Definition 9. A binary relation R on commands is a pointwise weak bisimulation up to if R is symmetric and ∀C, C , C 1 , . . . , C n ∈ Com: ∀s, t ∈ S:
Theorem 7. If R is a pointwise weak bisimulation up to , then we have R ⊆ . With W = C 1 , . . . , C i−1 , C i,1 , . . . , C i,m , C i+1 , . . . , C n we have |V , s| * |W , t| and (W, W ) ∈ Q. As is defined to be the union of all symmetric relations with the property of Definition 8, we see Q ⊆ .
Lemma 5.
1. If C 1 C 1 and C 2 C 2 then C 1 ; C 2 C 1 ; C 2 .
If
3. If C 1 C 1 then while B do C 1 while B do C 1 .
4. If C 1 C 1 , and C 2 C 2 then if B then C 1 else C 2 if B then C 1 else C 2 .
5. If C 1 C 1 , . . . , C n C n , then C 1 , . . . , C n C 1 , . . . , C n .
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of Lemma 3, only by using pointwise weak bisimulations up to instead of strong low-bisimulations.
1. Define R as the symmetric relation {(
Let (C 1 ; C 2 , C 1 ; C 2 ) ∈ R and s, t ∈ S be arbitrary with |C 1 ; C 2 , s| |C * , t| for some C * ∈ Com. We make a case distinction on C * according to the operational semantics: (a) C * = C 2 : From the operational semantics, we see |C 1 , s| | , t| . Since with C 2 C 2 by definition of R. (b) C * = C; C 2 V for some C ∈ Com and possibly empty V ∈ Com. From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 , s|
there are C ∈ Com and V ∈ Com with |C 1 , s| * | C V , t| , C C and V V . From the operational semantics we obtain |C 1 ; C 2 , s| * | C ; C 2 V , t| with (C; C 2 , C ; C 2 ) ∈ R (follows from C C , C 2 C 2 , and the definition of R) and V V . Hence, R is a pointwise weak bisimulation up to . 2. Define R as the symmetric relation {(fork(CV ) , fork(C V )) | C C , V V }. Let (fork(CV ) , fork(C V )) ∈ R and s ∈ S be arbitrary. From the operational semantics, we obtain |fork(CV ), s| | C V, s| and |fork(C V ), s| | C V , s| . From the definition of R and Definition 8, we obtain C V C V .
Hence, R is a pointwise weak bisimulation up to . 3. Define R as the symmetric relation
Let (while B do C 1 , while B do C 1 ) ∈ R and s, t ∈ S be arbitrary. We make a case distinction on the value of B in s: (a) |B, s| ↓ False: From the operational semantics, we get |while B do C 1 , s| | , s| and |while B do C 1 , s| | , s| . (b) |B, s| ↓ True: From the operational semantics, we get |while B do C 1 , s| |C 1 ; while B do C 1 , s| and |while B do C 1 , s| |C 1 ; while B do C 1 , s| with (C 1 ; while B do C 1 , C 1 ; while B do C 1 ) ∈ R.
Let (C 1 ; while B do C 2 , C 1 ; while B do C 2 ) ∈ R and s ∈ S be arbitrary with |C 1 ; while B do C 2 , s| |C * , t| for some C * ∈ Com. We make a case distinction on C * according to the operational semantics:
(a) C * = while B do C 2 : From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 , s| | , t| . Since C 1 C 1 we obtain |C 1 , s| * | , t| similar to the sequential composition case. From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 ; while B do C 2 , s| * |while B do C 2 , t| , and (C * , while B do C 2 ) in R.
(b) C * = C; while B do C 2 V for some C ∈ Com and possibly empty V ∈ Com. From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 , s| | C V, t| .
Since C 1 C 1 , there are C ∈ Com and V ∈ Com with |C 1 , s| * | C V , t| , C C and V V . From the operational semantics, we obtain |C 1 ; while B do C 2 , s| * | C ; while B do C 2 V , t| with (C; while B do C 2 , C ; while B do C 2 ) ∈ R (follows from C C , while B do C 2 while B do C 2 , and the definition of R), and V V .
Hence, R is a pointwise weak bisimulation up to . 4. Define R as the symmetric relation
) ∈ R and s ∈ S be arbitrary. We make a case distinction on the value of B in s: (a) |B, s| ↓ False: From the operational semantics |if B then C 1 else C 2 , s| |C 2 , s| and |if B then C 1 else C 2 , s| |C 2 , s| follow. By definition of R, we have C 2 C 2 . (b) |B, s| ↓ True: From the operational semantics |if B then C 1 else C 2 , s| |C 1 , s| and |if B then C 1 else C 2 , s| |C 1 , s| follow. By definition of R,
Hence, R is a pointwise weak bisimulation up to . 5. The assertion follows directly from Definition 8.
Proof (of Theorem 2).
We prove the first assertion for pointwise weak bisimulations (rather than weak bisimulations) by induction on the term structure of vectors of length 1, i.e. V ∈ Com V . By Lemma 5(5), the assertion is then lifted to arbitrary vectors in Com V , and with Lemma 4, we obtain what we wanted. Let σ, ρ be substitutions that are preserving and ground for V .
1. Suppose V is skip or an assignment. Then σ(V ) = ρ(V ) = V , and the assertion follows by reflexivity of . 2. Suppose V is of the form α; C or C ; α. By induction hypothesis we have σ(C ) ρ(C ). σ and ρ are preserving and ground for α, so we see σ(α) ρ(α). From Lemma 5, σV ρV follows. 3. Suppose V = C 1 ; C 2 with C 1 , C 2 ∈ Com V . By induction hypothesis we have σC 1 ρC 1 and σC 2 ρC 2 . From Lemma 5, σV ρV follows 4. Suppose V = while B do C with C ∈ Com V . By induction hypothesis we have σC ρC . From Lemma 5, σV ρV follows. 5. Suppose V = if B then C 1 else C 2 with C 1 , C 2 ∈ Com V . By induction hypothesis we have σC 1 ρC 1 and σC 2 ρC 2 . From Lemma 5, σV ρV follows. 6. Suppose V = fork (C 0 C 1 , . . . , C n ) with C i ∈ Com V for i = 0, . . . , n. By induction hypothesis we have σC i ρC i for i = 0, . . . , n. From Lemma 5, we first obtain σ C 1 , . . . , C n ρ C 1 , . . . , C n and then σV ρV .
The second assertion follows from part 1 and the observation that πV = V for every lifting V of V ∈ MWL.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We first state and prove two lemmas to simplify reasoning with L on Com V .
Lemma 6. If V 1 L V 2 holds for two programs V 1 , V 2 ∈ Com V then σV 1 L σV 2 holds for each substitution σ that is preserving (but not necessarily ground).
Proof. Given an arbitrary substitution η that is preserving and ground for σV 1 and σV 2 , we obtain η(σV 1 ) L η(σV 2 ) from V 1 L V 2 , Definition 4, and the fact that η • σ is preserving and ground for V 1 and V 2 . Since η was chosen arbitrarily, σV 1 L σV 2 follows.
Lemma 7. Let V, V , V 0 , V 0 , . . . , V n , V n ∈ Com V be programs that may contain meta-variables. If V i L V i holds for each i ∈ {0, . . . , n} according to Definition 4 and V L V can be syntactically derived from the assumptions V 0 L V 0 , . . . , V n L V n with the rules in Figure 1 then V L V holds according to Definition 4.
Proof. We argue by induction on the size of D, the derivation of
Base case: If D consists of zero rule applications then V L V equals one of the assumptions.
Induction assumption: The proposition holds for all derivations with less than n rule applications.
Step case: Assume D consists of n rule applications. We make a case distinction on the last rule applied in D. Here, we consider only the case where [SComp] is the last rule applied. The cases for the other rules can be shown along the same lines.
Let C 1 , C 1 , C 2 , C 2 ∈ Com V be arbitrary with C 1 L C 1 and C 2 L C 2 . Let σ be an arbitrary substitution that is preserving and ground for C 1 , C 1 , C 2 , C 2 . From C 1 L C 1 , C 2 L C 2 , and Definition 4 we obtain σC 1 L σC 1 and σC 2 L σC 2 . An application of [SComp] (for ground programs) yields (σC 1 ; σC 2 ) L (σC 1 ; σC 2 ). Since σ(C 1 ; C 2 ) = (σC 1 ; σC 2 ), (σC 1 ; σC 2 ) = σ(C 1 ; C 2 ), and σ was chosen freely, we obtain C 1 ; C 2 L C 1 ; C 2 from Definition 4.
Proof (of Theorem 3).
We prove the three propositions in different order.
2. By induction on the height of the given derivation of V → V : S, one obtains V = ρV for some preserving substitution ρ. The assertion follows by applying Theorem 2.1 to σ(V ) and (σρ)(V ) for an arbitrary σ that is preserving and ground for both V and V . 3. Since V L S implies V L S according to Theorem 1, it suffices to show that V → V : S implies V L S. We prove this second proposition by induction on the minimal height of the given derivation D of V → V : S. Base case: D consists of a single rule application. We perform a case distinction on this rule: [Var ] We have V = V = S = α for some meta-variable α ∈ V. Let σ be an arbitrary substitution that is preserving and ground for α. As σα is a command in Stut V that is free of meta-variables (i.e. a sequential composition of skip statements), we obtain σα L σα from Step case: We make a case distinction on the rule applied at the root of D.
[Seq] We have V = C 1 ; C 2 , V = C 1 ; C 2 , and S = S 1 ; S 2 with C 1 → C 1 : S 1 and C 2 → C 2 : S 2 . By induction assumption, C 1 L S 1 and C 2 L S 2 hold. An application of [SComp] in Figure 1 yields C 1 ; C 2 L S 1 ; S 2 .
[Par ] We have V = C 1 , . . . , C n , V = C 1 , . . . , C n , and S = S 1 , . . . , S n with C i → C i : S i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By induction assumption, C i L S i holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Application of [PComp] in Figure 1 yields
[Whl ] We have V = while B do C 1 , V = while B do C 1 , and S = while B do S 1 with B : low and C 1 → C 1 : S 1 . By induction assumption, C 1 L S 1 holds. An application of [WL] in Figure 1 yields 
, and S = if B then S 1 else S 2 with B : low , C 1 → C 1 : S 1 , and C 2 → C 2 : S 2 . By induction assumption, C 1 L S 1 and C 2 L S 2 hold. An application of [LIte] in Figure 1 yields 
and S = skip; σS 1 with B : high, C 1 → C 1 : S 1 , C 2 → C 2 : S 2 , and
From Lemma 6, we obtain σC 1 L σS 1 and σC 2 L σS 2 as σ is preserving. Then we obtain σC 2 L σS 1 from σC 2 L σS 2 , σS 1 L σS 2 (follows from σ ∈ U({S 1 ? L S 2 })), and the fact that L is symmetric and transitive. An application of [SHIte 2 ] in Figure 1 yields if B then σC 1 else σC 2 L skip; σS 1 . 1. From V L S and the symmetry of L , we obtain S L V . Then V L V follows from the transitivity of L .
B.4 Proof of Lemma 1
The language Pad V is given by the following grammar:
Here X is a placeholder for meta-variables in V, Id h is a placeholder for program variables in Var with domain high, and P 1 , P 2 are placeholders for commands in Pad V . We define const(C) = |C| skip + Id h ,Exp,Id h :high |C| Id h :=Exp , where |C| D denotes the number of occurrences of D as a subterm of C.
Proof (of Lemma 1).
We show each direction of the implication:
(=⇒) Assume C 1 L C 2 . Make a case distinction:
1. Assume const(C 1 ) = const(C 2 ). Let σ be the substitution mapping all variables in C 1 and C 2 to . The judgment σC 1 L σC 2 is not derivable with the rules in Figure 1 . According to Definition 4, this contradicts the assumption C 1 L C 2 as σ is preserving. Hence, this case is not possible. 2. Assume const(C 1 ) = const(C 2 ) and |C 1 | α = |C 2 | α for some meta-variable α ∈ V. Let σ be the substitution mapping α to skip and all other variables in C 1 and C 2 to . We have const(σC 1 ) = const(σC 2 ) and, thus, a contradiction to the assumption C 1 L C 2 (argue like in case 1). 3. Assume const(C 1 ) = const(C 2 ) and |C 1 | α = |C 2 | α for all meta-variables α ∈ V.
The above case distinction is complete as it covers all possible cases. Under the assumption C 1 L C 2 , only case 3. is possible. Hence, the implication holds.
(⇐=) The argument is by induction on the number of meta-variables occurring in (C 1 , C 2 ). Assume const(C 1 ) = const(C 2 ) and ∀α ∈ V :
Base case: No meta-variables occur in (C 1 , C 2 ). We obtain C 1 L C 2 from const(C 1 ) = const(C 2 ) and C 1 , C 2 ∈ Pad (argue by induction on const(C 1 )).
Step case: n + 1 meta-variables occur in (C 1 , C 2 ) and the proposition holds for all command pairs with n or less meta-variables. Let α be an arbitrary variable occurring in C 1 (and, hence, also in C 2 ). Let σ be an arbitrary substitution that is preserving and ground for C 1 and C 2 . We decompose σ into two substitutions σ 1 , σ 2 such that σ = σ 2 • σ 1 , dom σ 1 = {α }, and dom σ 2 = dom σ \ {α }. Note that σ 1 and σ 2 both are preserving. We have |σ 1 (C 1 )| α = |C 1 | α = |C 2 | α = |σ 1 (C 2 )| α for all α = α . Moreover, we have const(σ 1 (C 1 )) = const(σ 1 (C 2 )) because const(C 1 ) = const(C 2 ) and |C 1 | α = |C 2 | α . From the induction assumption (n meta-variables occur in σ(C 1 ), σ(C 2 )), we obtain σ 1 (C 1 ) L σ 1 (C 2 ). This means, in particular, σ 2 (σ 1 (C 1 )) L σ 2 (σ 1 (C 2 )) holds. Since σ = σ 2 • σ 1 and σ was chosen freely, we obtain C 1 L C 2 .
B.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof (Sketch). The proof of assertion 1 is a straightforward inductive argument over the structure of the derivation of V V and an inspection of each rule in Figure 3 .
To simplify the argument in the proof of part 2, we introduce the auxiliary language Mgl V , defined by
where Id l is a placeholder for program variables in Var with domain low , L, L 1 , L 2 are placeholders for commands in Mgl V , V is a placeholder for a command vector in Mgl V , and P t is a placeholder for a command of the form X or of the form P ; X with P ∈ Pad V .
The theorem follows immediately from:
2 ) does not share meta-variables with (V 1 , V 2 ) and each meta-variable occurs at most once in (V * These propositions are implied by Lemmas 8, 9, and 10, respectively, that we present in the following.
Lemma 8. Let V i ∈ Com, with liftings V i ∈ Com V and V * i ∈ Mgl V for i = 1, 2. Furthermore, assume every meta-variable occurs at most once in (V * 1 , V * 2 ) and that V * 1 and V * 2 do not share meta-variables with V 1 and V 2 . Then we have
More precisely, we can find ρ ∈ U({V * 1 ?
Proof. Suppose σ is a preserving substitution with σV 1 L σV 2 . We will inductively construct preserving substitutions ρ 1 with ρ 1 V * 1 L σV 1 , and ρ 2 with ρ 2 V * 2 L σV 2 with the property dom(ρ i ) ⊆ var (V * i ) for i = 1, 2. The metavariables in V * 1 and V * 2 are disjoint, so ρ = ρ 1 ∪ ρ 2 is well-defined and a unifier of V * 1 ?
We prove the assertion by induction on the term structure of V * 1 ∈ Mgl V , starting with V * 1 = C * 1 ∈ Mgl V and hence V 1 = C 1 ∈ Com and
Then by definition of Mgl V , C * 1 contains at least one meta-variable α. C 1 is also a lifting of C 1 , so it must be in Pad V ∪ { }. Let α 1 , . . . , α n be the meta-variables in C 1 . Define ρ(α) := σ(α 1 ); . . . ; σ(α n ), and set ρ(Y ) = for all Y = α occuring in C * 1 . C * 1 and C 1 are both liftings of C 1 , so they contain the same number of skips and assignments to high variables. By definition of ρ we see that σC 1 and ρC * 1 contain the same meta-variables and the same number of constants. Using the calculus in Figure 1 in combination with Lemma 1 we can conclude that ρC * 1
Suppose C * 1 = P ; if B then C * 1,1 else C * 1,2 ; C * . The command C 1 is also a lifting of C 1 , so it has the structure P ; if B then C 1,1 else C 1,2 ; C , with (possibly empty) commands P , C .
If B is a low conditional, we inductively construct substitutions
L σC 1,2 and ρ 4 C * L σC . The domains of the ρ i are disjoint by the hypothesis that dom(ρ i ) is a subset of the meta-variables of the corresponding subcommand and the assumption that every meta-variable occurs only once in C * 1 , so ρ = ρ 1 ∪ρ 2 ∪ρ 3 ∪ρ 4 is well-defined. Using Lemma 7 we can conclude ρC *
If B is a high conditional, the precondition σC 1 L σC 2 together with the definition of L on high conditionals shows that σC 1,1 L σC 1,2 holds. Applying induction hypothesis we obtain ρ 2,1 and ρ 2,2 with ρ 2,1 C * 1,1
1,2 and ρ 1 , ρ 3 with ρ 1 P L σP and ρ 3 C * L σC . With ρ = ρ 1 ∪ρ 2,1 ∪ρ 2,2 ∪ρ 3 we have ρC *
The remaining induction steps for Mgl V and the lifting to Mgl V can be treated in the same way as the low conditional case.
Lemma 9. Let V ∈ Com, with liftings V ∈ Com V and V * ∈ Mgl V . Furthermore, assume every meta-variable occurs at most once in V * and that V * does not share meta-variables with V . Then we have
Proof. We will inductively construct ρ with ρV * ?
L C * }). Suppose C * = P ; l:=Exp; C * 1 . C is also a lifting of C, so C = P ; l:=Exp; C 1 with possibly empty P , C . From σC L σC , and the definition of L we know that Exp : low and U({C 1 ? L C 1 }) = ∅. We apply induction hypothesis to obtain ρ ∈ U({C * 1 ?
L C * 1 ). By Lemma 7 we obtain ρC * L ρC * . Suppose C * = P ; if B then C * 1 else C * 2 ; C * 3 with B : low . C is also a lifting of C, so C = P ; if B then C 1 else C 2 ; C 3 . From σC L σC , and the definition of L we know that U({C i ? L C i }) = ∅ for i = 1, 2, 3. We apply induction hypothesis to obtain ρ i ∈ U({C * i ? L C * i }) for i = 1, 2, 3. ρ = ρ 1 ∪ ρ 2 ∪ ρ 3 is well-defined as the domains are pairwise disjoint, and ρ ∈ U({C * ? L C * }).
Suppose C * = P ; if B then C * 1 else C * 2 ; C * 3 with B : high. We then know that C = P ; if B then C 1 else C 2 ; C 3 because both C and C * are liftings of C. From σC L σC , and the definition of L we have σC 1 L σC 2 . By Lemma 8 we obtain ρ 1 with ρ 1 C * 1
(Note that every meta-variable occurs at most once in (C * 1 , C * 2 ).) Applying induction hypothesis to P and C * 3 we obtain ρ 0 with ρ 0 P L ρ 0 P and ρ 2 with ρ 2 C * 3
, which is what we wanted. The remaining induction steps for Mgl V and the lifting to Mgl V can be treated in the same way as the low conditional case.
Lemma 10. Let V ∈ Com and V ∈ Com V . If we have V V , then V ∈ Mgl V and every meta-variable occurs at most once in V .
Proof. By induction on the term structure of V ∈ Com: First, suppose V = C ∈ Com. If C = skip, we have C skip; X, which is in Mgl V . The same holds for C = h:=Exp. If C = l:=Exp, we have C X; l:=Exp; Y , which is in Mgl V . If C = while B do C , we have C C = X; while B do C ; Y with C C . By induction hypothesis, C ∈ Mgl V , and by definition of Mgl V we have C ∈ Mgl V . If C = fork(C V ) , we have C C = X; fork(C V ); Y with C C and V V . By induction hypothesis, C ∈ Mgl V , and V ∈ Mgl V and by definition of Mgl V we have C ∈ Mgl V . If C = if B then C 1 else C 2 , we have C C = X; if B then C 1 else C 2 ; Y with C 1 C 1 and C 2 C 2 . By induction hypothesis, C 1 , C 2 ∈ Mgl V , and by definition of Mgl V we have C ∈ Mgl V . Suppose now C = C 1 ; C 2 . Let C 1 C 1 , and let C 2 C 2 . By induction hypothesis C 1 , C 2 ∈ Mgl V . As C 1 ∈ Mgl V , we can write it as (implicit induction on Mgl V ) C 1 = C 1 ; P ; X for a maximal P ∈ Pad V and X ∈ V. Observe that P ; C 2 ∈ Mgl V , and thus C 1 ; P ; C 2 ∈ Mgl V . This is what we wanted, as we have C 1 ; C 2 C 1 ; P ; C 2 . If V = C 1 , . . . , C n ∈ Com, we have V V = C 1 , . . . , C n with C i C i for i = 1, . . . , n. By induction hypothesis, C 1 , . . . , C n ∈ Mgl V , and thus V ∈ Mgl V . The assertion that each meta-variable occurs at most once follows from the requirement that each meta-variable inserted while lifting must be fresh.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We prove a stronger assertion. In addition to the statement of Lemma 2 we prove that dom(η) ∪ var (ran(η)) ⊆ var (V 1 ) ∪ var (V 2 ), and that dom(η) ∩ var (ran(η)) = ∅ hold, where var (V ) denotes the set of all meta-variables occurring in V . We proceed by structural induction on the derivation tree D of the judgment L C i }), and dom(η i ) ∪ var (ran(η i )) ⊆ var (C i ) ∪ var (C i ) for i = 1, 2. As (var (C 1 ) ∪ var (C 1 )) and (var (C 2 ) ∪ var (C 2 )) are disjoint by hypothesis, η = η 1 ∪ η 2 is well-defined and dom(η) ∪ var (ran(η)) ⊆ var (V 1 ) ∪ var (V 2 ) and dom(η) ∩ var (ran(η)) = ∅ hold. With the help of Lemma 7 we see that η is indeed a unifier.
The remaining cases can be proved along the same lines.
B.7 Proof of Theorem 5
The proof of Theorem 5 proceeds via the following landmarks, where the language Mgl V is defined like in Appendix B.5.
= S 2 and every meta-variable occurs at most once in
We first show in full detail how Theorem 5 can be inferred from the above propositions. Then we give the definition of the relation . = and justify the propositions with Lemmas 12 and 11.
Proof (of Theorem 5:).
1. Let W be an arbitrary lifting of V . From Theorem 4 follows that σW L σW implies U(V L V ) = ∅. From Lemma 10 we see that V ∈ Mgl V and that every meta-variable occurs at most once in V . Restricting ourselves to commands in Com V for the moment and substituting C for V , it suffices to show the assertion ∃σ.σC L σC ⇒ C → C : S for all C ∈ Mgl V where every meta-variable occurs at most once. We proceed by induction on the term structure of C. If C ∈ Pad V , we always have C → C : S. If C = P ; Id l :=Exp; C 1 , and σC L σC, then we have σP L σP and σC 1 L σC 1 and Exp : low by definition of L . By applying induction hypothesis we obtain P → P : S 0 and C 1 → C 1 : S 1 . By definition of → this implies C → P ; Id l :=Exp; C 1 : S 0 ; Id l :=Exp; S 1 . If C = P ; if B then C 1 else C 2 ; C 3 with B : low , and σC L σC, then we have σP L σP and σC i L σC i for i = 1, 2, 3. By applying induction hypothesis we obtain P → P : S 0 and C i → C i : S i for i = 1, 2, 3. By definition of → this implies C → P ; if B then C 1 else C 2 ; C 3 : S 0 ; if B then S 1 else S 2 ; S 3
Fig. 7. Resembling Commands
If C = P ; if B then C 1 else C 2 ; C 3 with B : high, and σC L σC, then we have σP L σP and σC i L σC i for i = 1, 3. Furthermore we have σC 1 L σC 2 , from which we get σC 2 L σC 2 by transitivity and symmetry of L . Induction hypothesis yields P → P : S 0 and C i → C i : S i for i = 1, 2, 3. Every meta-variable occurs at most once in C, hence the same holds true for the subterms C 1 , C 2 . Proposition (a) shows that S 1 , S 2 ∈ Mgl V ∩ Slice V and S 1 . = S 2 and that every meta-variable occurs at most once in (S 1 , S 2 ). Proposition (b) implies that there is η with S 1 ? L S 2 :: η. η is a unifier of S 1 , S 2 , as Lemma 2 shows. We conclude C → P ; if B then ηC 1 else ηC 2 ; C 3 : S 0 ; skip; ηS 1 ; S 3 , which is what we wanted. The cases for the other constructors follow along the same lines as the low conditional. The assertion can then simply be lifted to command vectors. 2. By a straightforward induction over the derivation tree it follows that W → W : S implies W = σW for a preserving substitution σ. In the proof of Theorem 3 it was shown that S L W holds. By symmetry and transitivity of L we obtain σW L σW . The assertion now follows directly from part 1. of Theorem 5.
To simplify the atomic treatment of subcommands in Stut V of commands in Slice V in inductive arguments, we introduce the language Slice 
where L, L 1 , L 2 are placeholders for commands in Slice + V , V is a placeholder for a command vector in Slice + V , and P is a placeholder for a command in Stut V ∪{ }. By a straightforward induction one proves that Slice V ⊆ Slice
Definition 10. The binary relation . = on Slice + V is defined as the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure of the relation inductively defined in Figure 7 . We call commands V, V ∈ Mgl V with V . = V resembling.
Lemma 11. If S 1 , S 2 ∈ Mgl V ∩ Slice V and S 1 . = S 2 then there is an η with S 1 ? L S 2 :: η.
Proof. By induction on the term structure of S 1 :
Suppose S 1 ∈ Stut V . Then by definition of . =, S 2 must also be in Stut V . S 1 , S 2 ∈ Mgl V , hence they have terminal meta-variables. A simple induction on the length of S 1 shows that S 1 L S 2 :: η is derivable.
Suppose S 1 = P 1 ; if B 1 then S 1,1 else S 1,2 ; S 1,3 , where P 1 , S 1,1 , S 1,2 , S 1,3 are elements of Mgl V ∩ Slice V . By definition of . = and Mgl V we know that S 2 = P 2 ; if B 2 then S 2,1 else S 2,2 ; S 2,3 with P 2 , S 2,1 , S 2,2 , S 2,3 ∈ Mgl V ∩ Slice V and P 1 . = P 2 , S 1,i . = S 2,i for i = 1, 2, 3, and B 1 ≡ B 2 . We apply induction hypothesis and obtain P 1 Lemma 12. 1. If C ∈ Mgl V with C → C : S and if every meta-variable occurs at most once in C, then S ∈ Mgl V ∩ Slice V and var (S) ⊆ var (C) and every meta-variable occurs at most once in S. 2. If C 1 , C 2 ∈ Mgl V with U({C 1 ? L C 2 }) = ∅ and C i → C i : S i for i = 1, 2, then S 1 . = S 2 .
Proof. 1. It is easy to see that S ∈ Slice V holds, so we concentrate on containment in Mgl V . We proceed by induction on the term structure of C ∈ Mgl V . Suppose C ∈ Pad V ∩ Mgl V . By definition of Mgl V , C has a terminal metavariable. Then clearly S ∈ Mgl V as it contains a terminal meta-variable and no assignments. The condition on the meta-variables is fulfilled. Suppose now C = P ; if B then C 1 else C 2 ; C 3 with B : low and C → C : S.
Then by definition of → we have P → P : S 0 , C 1 → C 1 : S 1 , C 2 → C 2 : S 2 and C 3 → C 3 : S 3 . By induction hypothesis, S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ∈ Mgl V and the condition on the meta-variables holds. By definition of Mgl V S = S 0 ; if B then S 1 else S 2 ; S 3 ∈ Mgl V , and the condition on the meta-variables follows. Suppose now C = P ; if B then C 1 else C 2 ; C 3 with B : high. We have C → C : S, so by definition of → we have P → P : S 0 , C 1 → C 1 : S 1 , C 2 → C 2 : S 2 and C 3 → C 3 : S 3 and also S 1 L S 2 :: η for some η. By induction hypothesis, S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ∈ Mgl V and the condition on the meta-variables holds. As var (S i ) ⊆ var (C i ), (S 1 , S 2 ) contains every meta-variable at most once. With Lemma 13 we see that ηS 1 ∈ Mgl V , and every meta-variable occurs at most once in ηS 1 . From the proof of Lemma 2 it follows that dom(η) ∪ ran(var (η)) is a subset of the metavariables in S 1 and S 2 and hence the condition on the meta variables is fulfilled for S = (S 0 ; skip; ηS 1 ); S 3 . S 0 ; skip ∈ Stut V , and so by the definition of Mgl V , S 0 ; skip; ηS 1 ∈ Mgl V . By a straightforward induction one shows that D 1 ; D 2 ∈ Mgl V whenever D 1 , D 2 ∈ Mgl V , and so we conclude that S = (S 0 ; skip; ηS 1 ); S 3 ∈ Mgl V . The cases for the other constructors follow along the same lines as the low conditional. 2. Therefore let σC 1 L σC 2 . By symmetry and transitivity of L we conclude σC 1 L σC 1 and σC 2 L σC 2 . With help of Lemma 15 we obtain C 1 , C 2 ∈ Slice V with S 1
= S 2 . Lemma 14 shows that C 1 L C 2 implies C 1 . = C 2 , and by transitivity of . = we get S 1 . = S 2 .
Lemma 13. If S 1 , S 2 ∈ Mgl V ∩ Slice V with S 1 L S 2 :: η and if every variable occurs at most once in (S 1 , S 2 ) then ηS 1 , ηS 2 ∈ Mgl V ∩ Slice V and every metavariable occurs at most once in ηS 1 .
Proof. We prove the assertion by induction on the term structure of S Figure 4 it follows that S 2 = P 2 ; if B 2 then S 2,1 else S 2,2 ; S 2,3 with B 1 ≡ B 2 and that P 1 ? L P 2 :: η 0 , S 1,1 ? L S 2,1 :: η 1 , S 1,2 ? L S 2,2 :: η 2 , and S 1,3 ? L S 2,3 :: η 3 are derivable. By induction hypothesis have η 0 P 1 , η 1 S 1,1 , η 2 S 1,2 , η 3 S 1,3 ∈ Mgl V ∩ Slice V . With η = η 0 ∪ η 1 ∪ η 2 ∪ η 3 and the fact that the domains and variable ranges of the η i are mutually disjoint (see the proof of Lemma 2) we have ηS 1 = η 0 P 1 ; if B 1 then η 1 S 1,1 else η 2 S 1,2 ; η 3 S 1,3 , which is in Mgl V ∩ Slice V and contains every meta-variable at most once.
All other constructors can be treated in the same way as the low conditional.
Lemma 14. Let S 1 , S 2 ∈ Slice V . Then we have
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of S 1 , where we make use of the fact that Slice V ⊆ Slice + V . If S 1 ∈ Stut V , then by definition of L and the precondition S 2 ∈ Slice V we know that S 2 ∈ Stut V , and hence S 1 . = S 2 . If S 1 = P 1 ; if B 1 then S 1,1 else S 1,2 ; S 1,3 with B 1 : low , then by definition of L we know that S 2 = P 2 ; if B 2 then S 2,1 else S 2,2 ; S 2,3 with P 1 , P 2 = or P 1 L P 2 , and S 1,i L S 2,i for i = 1, 2, 3 and B 1 ≡ B 2 . By definition of . =, P 1 . = P 2 holds, and by induction hypothesis we see S 1,i . = S 2,i for i = 1, 2, 3. By definition of . = we conclude S 1 . = S 2 . The other constructors follow in a similar fashion.
Lemma 15. Let C ∈ Mgl V with σ ∈ U({C L C}) and C → C : S. Then there is C ∈ Slice V with C L σC and C . = S.
Proof. We proceed by structural induction on C ∈ Mgl V . Suppose C ∈ Pad V . Choose C as σC, where all assignments to high variables are replaced by skips. We have C ∈ Stut V . We also have S ∈ Stut V , and so C . = S. Suppose C = P ; if B then C 1 else C 2 ; C 3 with B : low . We have σC L σC, so by definition of L we obtain σP L σP and σC i L σC i for i = 1, 2, 3.
From the precondition C → C : S and the definition of → we get P → P : S 0 and C i → C i : S i for i = 1, 2, 3. We apply induction hypothesis to the corresponding command-pairs and obtain P , C i with P L σP , P . = S 0 , and C i L σC i , C i . = S i for i = 1, 2, 3. Then we can conclude C = P ; if B then C 1 else C 2 ; C 3 L σC, as well as C . = S. Suppose C = P ; if B then C 1 else C 2 ; C 3 with B : high. We have σC L σC, so by definition of L we obtain σP L σP , σC 1 L σC 1 σC 3 L σC 3 and σC 1 L σC 2 . By symmetry and transitivity of L we conclude σC 2 L σC 2 . From the precondition C → C : S and the definition of → we get P → P : S 0 and C i → C i : S i for i = 1, 2, 3. We apply induction hypothesis to the corresponding command-pairs and obtain P , C i with the desired properties for i = 1, 2, 3. Define C as P ; skip; C 1 ; C 3 ∈ Slice V . We have C L σC by Lemma 7. On the other hand, S = S 0 ; skip; ηS 1 ; S 3 for some preserving substitution η. We are left to show S . = C . From hypothesis we know C 1 . = S 1 and C 3 . = S 3 . A straightforward induction shows that S 1 . = ηS 1 for every preserving η. Another straightforward induction shows that . = is a congruence with respect to sequential composition and so we conclude C = P ; skip; C 1 ; C 3 . = S 0 ; skip; ηS 1 ; S 3 = S. The other constructors follow along the same lines as the low conditional.
